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The first decade of Malaysia’s constitutional independence has sometimes been 
interpreted as conforming to a neo-colonial paradigm, partly exhibited by the creation 
of the Federation of Malaysia and the subsequent Confrontation with Indonesia, and 
also exercised through the collaboration of the Malay and Chinese elites with foreign 
capital until the political upheaval of 1969 led to a more nationalist government from 
1970.1  Stockwell has challenged this interpretation, arguing that political rather than 
economic issues were paramount in the creation of Malaysia, that the UK did not 
command the transition in 1957 or 1963 and that the creation of Malaysia coincided 
with a reduction of British influence in the region.2   White’s examination of the 
legacy of British companies in Malaysia and their relations with the state during the 
1960s also contradicts the characterisation of economic neo-colonialism.3  While the 
legacy of British business interests has been well documented, less attention has been 
focussed on the continuation of monetary links between Malaysia and Britain into the 
post-colonial period, although Hinds and Krozewski established that Malaya’s 
monetary links to Britain were important in the late 1950s because of the large 
sterling reserves held by the colony on the eve of independence.4  This article extends 
this work by exploring the unravelling of these monetary links between 
Malaya/Malaysia and Britain that lasted for 15 years after constitutional 
independence. An examination of the often tense and difficult relations between 
London and Kuala Lumpur over reserves policy promises fresh perspectives on the 
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allegations of collaboration between Malayan elites and London by examining.  In 
particular, a close look at the monetary relations between Britain, Singapore and 
Malaysia contradicts Stockwell’s contention that ‘Malaya’s economic importance for 
Britain was on the wane’ by 1960.5  Tan Siew Sin acted as Finance Minister from 
1959-74, both before and after the 1969 watershed, and White has implicated him in 
the emergence of ‘crony capitalism’ in Malaysia during his time in power.6  Tan, 
along with Ismail Ali, Governor of the central bank (like Tan, Cambridge educated 
and a supporter of Tunku Abdul Rahman from the 1940s7) led Malaysia’s response to 
the collapse of the international monetary system and the gradual disentanglement 
from sterling.  In 1966 Tan’s semi-official profile written in London to prepare for 
meetings with the Chancellor of the Exchequer described him as ‘excitable and too 
easily led into controversy’, ‘obstinate and self-satisfied’ and displaying ‘very strong 
anti-British feelings’.8  Clearly, there was scope for conflict. 
      The end of the formal colonial period for Malaya in 1957 did not mark the end of 
the close monetary relations that had developed among Britain, Malaya and 
Singapore.  Both Malaysia and Singapore continued to maintain their pegged 
exchange rate to sterling until June 1973, and to hold the bulk of their reserves in 
sterling even after the devaluation of the pound in 1967.  The link to sterling grew out 
of the 19th century colonial monetary system, evolving into the post-1945 sterling area 
system, which protected its members from British capital controls in return for 
members holding reserves in sterling and pegging exchange rates to sterling.  The 
sterling area countries were mainly British colonies, commonwealth countries (except 
Canada), and some Middle Eastern states with historic links to the UK.  Soon after the 
constitutional independence of Malaya was achieved at the end of the 1950s, the 
sterling area system began to unwind as the pound as an international currency 
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faltered and the interests of developing sterling area economies diverged from those 
of Britain.  At this time the British government began its campaign for closer links to 
Europe with its first application to join the EEC, and decided in 1966 to withdraw 
British troops from East of Suez (primarily from Singapore and Malaysia) as part of 
the redefinition of Britain’s international role.9    
      Along with other developing economies, Malaysia was caught up in the turmoil of 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the second half 
of the 1960s.  Although Malaysia’s robust balance of payments and economic growth 
allowed it to weather these global storms, they did pose challenges for the national 
government and formed part of the transition to a truly independent international 
monetary policy, presaged by the introduction of a national currency in 1967 and then 
activated by the controlled floating of the Malaysian dollar from 1973.  During this 
period, Malaysia also played a distinctive role in the determination of how the 
international monetary system evolved, because of the country’s importance to the 
development of sterling policy in London.  By June 1966 Malaysia was the world’s 
fifth largest holder of overseas sterling balances (after Australia, Kuwait, Hong Kong, 
and Ireland) with over 17% of total overseas sterling area sterling reserves.  Malaysia 
was also the second largest government holder of sterling assets in the world, 
exceeded only by Australia.  This should have given Malaysia considerable 
bargaining power in London over the disposition of these assets, but in the end the 
sterling ties proved difficult to disengage.   
     
Reserves Strategy before the Sterling Devaluation of 1967 
    As Schenk has argued, while Malaya was negotiating its independence in the mid-
1950s, the potential for monetary independence had a symbolic importance as an 
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emblem of state-hood.10  Malaya’s money supply, like that of other colonies, was 
issued by a currency board that held sterling reserves at least equal to value the 
Malayan currency issued.  Every Malayan dollar was thus backed by sterling and 
freely convertible and local currency was issued automatically on presentation of 
sterling.  The automatic nature of a currency board limits the monetary policy tools 
available to the government since it removes the power to control the pace of currency 
issue.  The currency board operated for the Federation of Malaya and for Singapore, 
British North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei despite the separate political 
administrations in these territories.  Despite the relatively speedy transition to 
independence on the peninsula, the governments of Singapore and the UK fought hard 
during the run-up to Merdeka in 1957 to continue to have a common currency operate 
in these territories.  This reflected both economic imperatives (the close integration of 
production and trade facilities) and political hopes for the eventual union of the two 
main states.   In the end a compromise was reached whereby the Malayan central 
bank, Bank Negara Malaysia (hereafter BNM) began operations in 1959, but the joint 
currency board continued to issue currency for the two territories.     
     When the joint currency board with Singapore was being planned in the 1950s, the 
Malayan side argued strongly for the statutes to include the option of investing in 
assets other than sterling, specifically dollar assets.   The Bank of England was 
powerfully opposed to the diversification of the currency reserve.  As long as the M$ 
was pegged to sterling, holding dollar securities would introduce an exchange risk – if 
the US$ devalued then the reserves cover would be reduced.  The Malayans, however, 
reasonably argued that this was a risk worth taking since sterling was more likely to 
be devalued, and sterling securities were prone to loss of value.11  Moreover, the Bank 
of England’s argument assumed that the M$ would keep its peg to sterling rather than 
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follow a US$ devaluation.   While the Bank of England wanted this to be a breaking 
point in the negotiations for a joint currency board, the Treasury and Colonial Office 
believed that the political as well as economic consequences of not achieving an 
agreement were too great to risk.12  In the end, partly in recognition that the right to 
diversify the currency reserve would be more de jure than de facto, the Malayans 
suggested that any investment in non-sterling assets would require unanimous 
agreement among the constituent members (including the UK through its control of 
Sabah and Sarawak).  The theoretical ability to diversify reserves, however, was 
viewed in Kuala Lumpur (KL) as an important political symbol of independence even 
though they made clear to the UK negotiators that ‘the unanimity rule will ensure that 
non-sterling investment will be strictly limited in practice’.13
      With the political union of Malaya and Singapore, along with Sabah and Sarawak 
in September 1963, responsibility for currency matters shifted to the Federation 
government, and at the end of 1964 the government announced its intention to 
terminate the currency board as of June 1966, and to give the BNM its issuing powers 
for the Federation as a whole.  On 9 August 1965, however, Singapore was abruptly 
separated politically from Malaysia.  Efforts to continue the currency union between 
the two states began almost immediately, but the talks finally foundered in August 
1966 over the control that Singapore claimed over its share of the foreign exchange 
backing of the currency.14 Ultimately, the continuation of the currency link did not 
suit either the political or economic goals of the Malaysian government.    
      Economically, Malaysia sought to reduce the integration of the two territories and 
thereby promote economic development in Malaysia by discouraging the use of 
Singapore for trade.  Reflecting on the period when Singapore was part of the 
Federation, the Finance Minister, KS Lim observed that ‘They [Malaysia] always 
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think themselves as the bigger brother. You must take orders from them in almost 
everything’.15   Political relations had disintegrated during the mid-1960s, which 
further undermined the prospects for integration.  As Lim recalled the Malaysian 
Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman observing prior to expelling Singapore, ‘You 
know, when you have a sore, you better cut it off, have a surgical operation’.16  The 
IMF mission to the two states in November 1965 delicately described ‘a certain 
mutual disenchantment which followed the separation of Singapore from Malaysia 
does not help to create now the cordial atmosphere which is important for the 
negotiation of a treaty between Malaysia and Singapore for a future currency union.’17  
In August 1966 each territory set out to develop its own national currencies. 
     The problem of dividing the currency board’s foreign exchange reserves among 
the constituent states was a prolonged source of dispute. In 1964 the currency board 
held M$1.56b or 47% of the two territories’ foreign exchange so the distribution of 
these assets between Singapore and Malaysia was not a trivial issue.  Although most 
of the assets were distributed after 1967, the final distribution was only resolved in 
March 1972.  Singapore received 18.3% (£6.17m) of the assets of the currency board 
(its share of the distribution of profits) rather than the 35% it claimed (its share of the 
currency redemption).  Malaysia got 74% (£24.95m). 
     On 12 June 1967 separate currencies were finally introduced but the principle of 
currency union was not completely abandoned.  To retain the advantages of monetary 
integration each currency circulated at par in the other territory and the accumulated 
balances were periodically returned to the country of issue. The external exchange 
rates were also fixed at parity in terms of gold with sterling as the intervention 
currency. Singapore continued with a currency board and Malaysia kept a high ratio 
of reserve backing, so they retained elements of the currency board system.  The 
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minimum foreign exchange reserve was formally set at 80.59% of currency issued but 
the central bank publicly expressed its intention to maintain reserves well in excess of 
this limit.18  Their 1969 accounts noted that the policy of the government and the 
BNM was to keep at least 100% gold and foreign exchange cover for the currency in 
circulation at all times.19  In addition, the BNM was required to hold foreign reserves 
equal to 35% of its deposit liabilities, although in practice that proportion had never 
fallen below 74% from 1964-1967.  In June 1967 when it started to issue notes, 
external reserves totalled $463m, well in excess of the combined $290.5m combined 
statutory minimum required against currency issue and deposit liabilities.20  By the 
end of 1969, BNM’s foreign assets were still 159 per cent of the combined statutory 
minimum required and 175 per cent of the currency issue alone.21  Despite the 
commitment to a high reserve ratio, an important consequence of the introduction of 
the Malaysian dollar was the decision finally to diversify currency reserves out of 
sterling and into other foreign currencies, which reflected the government’s growing 
disenchantment with the link to sterling.   
    Malaysian attitudes to sterling evolved through the repeated crises of the 1960s 
when the sterling exchange rate to the US$ was under repeated speculative pressure.  
The Malaysian Treasury formalised its position during the November 1964 sterling 
crisis, when the International Tin Council (ITC) considered diversifying its cash 
assets out of sterling.  The government’s position was that although Malaysia was a 
major holder of sterling, it would not diversify its assets in response to a possible 
devaluation.22  They explained that this decision was taken to avoid putting further 
pressure on the exchange rate which would ‘therefore tend to increase the possibility 
of bringing about a devaluation, which would be unwelcome to this government, as 
the Malayan dollar is linked with sterling’.  Malaysia’s large sterling assets were thus 
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identified as a constraint on policy since diversification would threaten their value.  
Under the Malaya British Borneo Currency Agreement of 1960 the Malayan dollar 
was fixed at 2s4d so a devaluation of sterling would necessitate a devaluation of the 
M$.   The Treasury also noted that deposit interest rates in London were higher than 
elsewhere, so diversification would reduce the ITC’s income.  This argument also 
held for the government’s reserves, which benefited from high returns in London.   
     Archive records of the Bank Negara show that, in line with government policy, 
they did not diversify during the November 1964 sterling crisis.  Indeed by December 
1964, holdings of UK Treasury bills, government securities and deposits at the Bank 
of England had increased while US time deposits had been halved from M$15m 
(US$4.9m) to M$7.4m compared with October 1964.  Figure 1 shows the changing 
distribution of the external reserves of the Bank Negara based on archival data. By 
1966, two thirds of Malaysia’s gold and foreign exchange reserves were held directly 
at the BNM, with the rest in the government’s direct control.23
 
[insert Figure 1 here] 
 
     A lasting break in reserves management strategy is only visible from the sterling 
crisis of June 1966.  At this time the government reversed its position on 
diversification of the ITC buffer stock, recommending that diversification should be 
supported although ‘the Malaysian delegate should not create the impression that 
Malaysia is deliberately seeking to weaken sterling even further by this move. The 
stand should be justified on the old adage of not putting all one’s eggs in one 
basket’.24  Tan asked London for an exchange guarantee for their sterling reserves at 
this time, but was refused.  The Chancellor urged him not to increase pressure on the 
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pound again in Washington in September 1966, just at the time when the UK was 
planning its withdrawal of troops from Southeast Asia, and again Tan agreed. 
      The unpublished monthly accounts of the Bank Negara certainly suggest an new 
and more active policy of switching out of UK Treasury Bills and into other assets 
including US$ accounts, but also increasing sterling deposits at the Bank of England.  
Tan later recalled instructing Ismail to ‘take our reserves out of sterling, a million 
pounds a week’ during the sterling crisis in the summer of 1966, and in June the BNM 
records show a withdrawal of deposits at the Bank of England by M$1.1m and M$8m 
of sales of UK government securities (about £1m combined).  The funds were shifted 
to an extra M$2m on deposit at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and an extra 
M$10m in US$ term deposits.25  In August, Eric Haslam of the Bank of England 
visited KL to persuade Ismail to resist adding pressure to the crisis, although the 
archive data show that Ismail continued to run down his holdings of UK Treasury 
Bills to the end of the year.  The proceeds were split between increases in Bank of 
England deposits and US$ time deposits, so the operation was not merely a 
diversification out of sterling and would appear at the Bank of England to be a move 
back into sterling.  In November 1966 Ismail also began new investments of M$25m 
(£3m) in UK fixed deposits, which accounts for the increase in ‘other’ in Figure 1.     
      In July 1967, with the prospect of the BNM acquiring substantial sterling assets 
from the former joint currency board, London expected renewed calls for 
diversification.  The Treasury and Bank of England were persuaded that Malaysia 
could not be prevented from diversifying this time, but they hoped to achieve a 
gradual and agreed programme to lessen the immediate pressure on the sterling 
exchange rate arising from sales of Malaysian sterling assets.26  There was some 
confusion or at least inconsistency between directly held government assets and those 
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of the central bank, perhaps due to political sensitivities of the government during the 
withdrawal of British forces.  During a visit to London in early July 1967 to discuss 
aid to compensate for the British military withdrawal, Tan reassured the Chancellor 
that he did not expect to engage in further diversification during 1967.  In turn the 
Chancellor reassured Tan that ‘there was no question of devaluation’ of sterling.27  A 
few weeks later, however, Ismail notified the Bank of England that his goal was to 
reduce the sterling proportion of the currency reserves to two-thirds over the next six 
months, converting sterling at a rate of £3m per month to a total of £20m.28  In the 
end, the diversification did not proceed as quickly as planned and by the eve of the 
devaluation the sterling proportion of total reserves was only 5% lower than in June 
(falling from 87% to 82%).  As a result, Malaysia was caught out with large sterling 
holdings and the devaluation of sterling by 14.3% on 19 November cost the reserves 
M$250m (US$81.5m).   
 
The Devaluation of Sterling November 1967 
The sense of betrayal felt in KL after the sterling devaluation was intensified by the 
way that it exposed the differences between Singapore and Malaysia in regard to their 
financial relations with Britain.  Malaysia was revealed as having fallen far behind the 
more entrepreneurial and self-interested Singaporean policy of secretly diversifying 
reserves in the run-up to the devaluation.  This was politically damaging for the 
Malaysian government and led them into a defensive position of trying to catch up 
with Singapore and to identify (and act on) Malaysia’s own national interests rather 
than taking advice from London.  On 20 November, just after the devaluation, Tan 
told the Straits Times that he had repeatedly met with the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
over the past few months and ‘received the most specific assurances that devaluation 
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of sterling was practically unthinkable.’ Asked if he was shocked by events, Tan 
bluntly replied ‘what would be your reaction if you were in my place’?  A few days 
later the Prime Minister tried to put a better gloss on Malaysian policy, telling the 
newspapers that ‘about a month back we had the feeling that the British Government 
would devaluate [sic] and so we made up our minds and decided slowly to withdraw 
from the sterling reserve, and bought gold and transferred some to the US. We were in 
a difficult position and we had to do it gradually. If we did not plan our move, much 
more would have been lost’.29  Again, the size of the reserves mitigated against quick 
diversification.  IMF data show that Malaysia began to buy gold in August 1967 and 
by November had accumulated US$24.15m or 5% of reserves compared with 
US$1.05m in July or 0.2% of reserves.30
     Immediately after the devaluation, Singapore’s Finance Minister Goh Keng Swee 
announced that he had reduced the sterling proportion of Singapore’s reserves to 50% 
in the months running up to November.  This took Malaysia, the Bank of England and 
the UK Treasury by surprise.  In London, it had been assumed that about 80% of 
Singapore’s foreign exchange reserves were held in sterling, but Goh revealed in The 
Straits Times that their reserves amounted to S$1251.6m of which only 50% was held 
in sterling, 41% in US dollars and the rest in DM, SwFr and Frfr.  The diversification 
had been achieved by investing accruals to the reserves in non-sterling assets while 
leaving the bulk of sterling reserves in London untouched.   Table 1 shows the 
position of Malaysia in comparison with its sterling neighbours.  Diversification had 
begun in a small way by 1966 but was far behind Australia and Singapore.     
 
[insert Table 1 here] 
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At the start of February 1968 Choi Siew Hong, Deputy Governor of BNM, met with 
officials at the Bank of England to set out new plans for the currency reserves.31  The 
objective by the end of the year was a distribution of 40% each for sterling and US$ 
(compared with the 66% target in July 1967), with the remainder equally split 
between gold and other currencies.  As Jeremy Morse of the Bank of England 
described, ‘their losses on sterling devaluation have strengthened their determination 
not to be caught again.  Their ministers are under attack in parliament on their past 
policies regarding sterling and the Singapore example and propaganda make things 
doubly difficult’.  The Bank’s counter-offer was a 50% ratio for sterling with the 
conversion of sterling assets spread evenly over the course of 1968 (£2m per month), 
a compromise subsequently accepted by Ismail.  The programme was set to cost the 
UK reserves £22m (a saving of £12m over Choi’s original proposal) and would bring 
the overall proportion of sterling in government and central bank reserves to 57%.  
The government’s holdings of about £20m were considered more secure since sales 
they were mainly British securities trading well below the purchase value.32  
Meanwhile, however, by the summer of 1968 a comprehensive system to manage the 
diversification of sterling reserves globally was being prepared that would force all 
official holders of sterling to commit themselves to minimum shares of sterling in 
their reserves, and Malaysia would play a key role in this solution. 
 
Re-negotiating the sterling link 1968-72 
     For countries holding substantial sterling reserves, the impact of the collapse of the 
international monetary system from 1968-73 was profoundly affected by the 
negotiation of Sterling Agreements with London.  From July-September 1968 
representatives of the Bank of England and UK Treasury were sent to 34 countries 
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holding sterling to agree the minimum proportion of sterling to be held in each 
country’s reserves (known as the MSP) in return for an offer of an exchange 
guarantee of the US$ value of 90% of official sterling reserves.  Holders would be 
compensated if the pound fell below US$2.38.  Britain’s ability to honour these 3-
year agreements was underpinned by the Basle Agreement of September 1968 under 
which the central banks of the G10 promised US$2b in short term credit to cover 
diversification of global sterling reserves.   
     Figure 2 shows the accelerated diversification of Malaysia’s reserves while the 
negotiations over the sterling agreement were underway from July to September 1968. 
[insert Figure 2 here] 
 
     In May 1968, Ismail Ali toured Europe to canvas various central bankers’ reactions 
to the possibility of Malaysia diversifying its reserves into European currencies.33  At 
the end of May and the start of June, he made two deposits of SFr5m each at the Bank 
for International Settlements.  By mid-August 1968, when the sterling agreement was 
being negotiated, he had deposited US$8m, DM5.1m and SFr15m, and by the end of 
September when the sterling agreement was signed these totals had risen to 
US$13.7m, DM41.75m, SFr15.12m, a total equivalent to about US$28m or £12m.34  
The increase in DM assets is particularly striking and related to the strength of the 
DM in international markets.  In November 1968 Malaysia issued a DM25m bond and 
in February 1969, they issued a further DM40m bond.  In July 1969 they also notified 
the Bank of England that they would retain US$25m raised from a consortium of 
commercial banks in US$.35  A further consortium package of US$50m was raised in 
February 1971, and Choi warned the Bank of England that this would reduce the 
proportion of sterling in the reserves.36  Reserves diversification was thus 
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accomplished partly through international borrowing that formed part of the Second 
Malaysia Plan.  As well as currencies, Ismail also continued to buy gold until the end 
of 1969 by which time it comprised 10% of foreign reserves. 
     At first it seemed that London’s negotiations over the sterling agreement with 
Malaysia would be quite straightforward, but in the end Malaysia was the last country 
to finalise its sterling agreement and the negotiations were bitter as well as prolonged.  
The initial optimism in London arose rather naively from the cooperative attitude of 
KL in the run-up to the devaluation of 1967.  The negotiating brief noted that ‘apart 
from some relatively small-scale diversification in 1966…Malaysia have been co-
operative in their sterling policy. Since 1966, although wishing to reduce their high 
sterling percentage of overall reserves, they have consulted us in advance over 
proposed diversification’.37   In July 1968, on the eve of the negotiations, Prime 
Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman visited London and was reluctantly favourable to the 
proposed agreements, remarking to the Australian High Commissioner that he had 
accepted the general proposals because ‘we had to, we could not afford another 
devaluation, we lost so much the first time’.38   This initial acquiescence was quickly 
reversed by Tan as the negotiations began in KL.   
     The British goal at the outset was to commit Malaysia to hold a minimum sterling 
proportion (MSP) in its official reserves of 73%, and also to get them to deposit 40-
50% of its total non-sterling currency reserves with the BIS, which would be available 
for the UK to borrow.39   The MSP was much higher than the 57% agreed in February 
1968, and was also higher than the proposed settlement with Singapore, but London 
believed that the offer of an exchange guarantee for sterling reserves should be 
rewarded by Malaysia holding more sterling.  The London negotiating brief noted that 
‘Malaysia may wish to continue with their agreed diversification programme…if they 
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ask… we could not refuse to honour our earlier agreement. Nevertheless, we should 
seek to deter them from further diversification by pointing to the fact that the 
guarantee would be its equivalent and indeed would be more far-reaching and 
that…sterling investments would be likely to produce a better yield than those in 
other currencies’.40  In August 1968, Ismail was earning 6% on 12 month US$ 
deposits at the BIS and only 4% on other currencies, while the Bank Rate in London 
was 7.5% and the TBill rate was 6.95%. 
     The British negotiator was the highly experienced Christopher Fogarty, Treasury 
representative in Southeast Asia, who was joined by Eric Haslam of the Bank of 
England, who often visited Malaysia.  At first, on 11 July Tan appeared favourable to 
the Basle agreement, noting publicly that  ‘This facility [Basle Facility] is a great step 
forward as it goes well beyond anything which has been agreed before, both in 
magnitude and in length of term… It should give much greater confidence to holders 
of this currency’.41  When the private negotiations began in earnest, however, he 
quickly showed his true colours.  In common with other countries he refused to accept 
an obligation to pay interest for the guarantee, and this was finally abandoned in all 
negotiations at the beginning of September.  More fundamentally, he cast doubt on 
the whole international monetary system, and predicted a US$ devaluation in the near 
future.  He scolded the leading economies in the world, claiming that ‘In Britain in 
particular and also in other developed countries, there had been a major failure of 
Governments resulting in labour indiscipline, continuous inflation, and general lack of 
confidence, which was now painfully justified, in any paper currencies.’  On the Basle 
Agreement, ‘The US$2b was quite inadequate and could easily be frittered away in a 
couple of years on maintaining the UK standard of living’.  These serious criticisms 
of British policy were supported by Ismail, who was also present.  Tan concluded that 
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‘the scheme was not attractive to Malaysia and he would rather take a risk in 
diversifying further out of the sterling - and indeed perhaps also out of dollars, it 
might be better to hold reserves in tin or rubber equities than in any of the traditional 
reserve media including gold’.42  Given the volatility of primary product prices, this 
would have been foolhardy indeed, but this opening gambit was evidence of Tan’s 
intention to use the negotiations to harden his position vis a vis London.  It was very 
clear that Malaysia’s position compared to other sterling countries was a prime 
consideration for Tan.  Thus, Tan hoped to prolong the negotiations until his rivals in 
Singapore and Australia had concluded theirs to ensure that Malaysia was not treated 
worse by the British.  Meanwhile, as we have seen above, diversification out of 
sterling and into other currencies accelerated. 
     In their telegrams back to London, Haslam and Fogarty both stressed the 
sensitivity in KL to the terms of any agreement concluded with Singapore.  
Nevertheless, they agreed that Tan should not be promised terms as favourable as 
those agreed with Singapore.  Goh and his colleagues in Singapore were also 
negotiating fiercely, and by mid-August it was still not clear that any agreement with 
Singapore would be reached by the deadline of the Basle meetings on 7-9 September.  
Moreover, Singapore’s total sterling holdings were much smaller than Malaysia, so 
London could afford greater concessions to them which would prove impossible to 
replicate for Malaysia.  Talks were resumed in KL on 21 August when Fogarty 
announced concessions on the charge (dropped), duration (3 years instead of 7), un-
guaranteed proportion of sterling reserves (10%) and MSP (50% for government 
reserves plus provision for the currency board reserves to bring the total to 56%).  Tan 
accepted these concessions except for the MSP, and countered with an offer of a firm 
public commitment to 30% overall, but a private agreement to maintain a working 
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target of 50%.  London could not accept such a low public MSP, which would set a 
precedent for other negotiations as well as potentially cost the reserves heavily, even 
if there was a private undertaking to maintain a higher proportion.   
     The Malaysian Cabinet considered the UK proposals on 4 September with the start 
of the Basle meeting looming three days later.  The timing put the Malaysians in a 
strong position since if an agreement was to be signed by the deadline, London would 
have to accept the Cabinet’s terms.  By this time Malaysian ministers had learned of 
the terms of the agreement concluded with Australia under which Canberra had 
negotiated an MSP of 40% with a private working target of 46%.  Nevertheless, the 
Malaysian Cabinet sought to exercise the power accorded by the approaching 
deadline by insisting on an MSP of 35% with a target practical working level of 45%, 
and also that the whole agreement should remain unpublished.  This last proviso 
emphasizes the important political concerns of the Malaysian government and its 
sensitivity to public opinion about it ability to protect Malaysia’s national interest.43  
Moreover, the Cabinet insisted that the remaining assets of the currency board should 
be excluded from the agreement.  London responded by advising that despite the 
looming deadline ‘we see no possibility of reaching an agreement with Malaysia on 
the basis of the terms which their Cabinet has proposed’.44  The Sterling Negotiations 
Group in London deemed the failure to get agreement before 7 September 
‘unfortunate but not disastrous’, and advised the team in KL to call Tan’s bluff and 
suspend discussions for the time being.45 Meanwhile, agreement with Singapore on a 
40% MSP was concluded on 8 September (just in time to be reported at the Basle 
meeting) after Goh had learned of the terms agreed by Australia, which convinced 
him that no better deal was likely to be forthcoming.46  Singapore did not have to give 
 17
any private indication of working target since its actual sterling balances were close to 
the MSP level already. 
     In London, Ministers were fed up with Tan’s intransigence and sought to force 
Malaysia to sign a sterling agreement by threatening to cut the British aid promised as 
an offset to the defence withdrawal from the region.  A total of £25m had been 
promised to Malaysia of which only £7.15m was already committed, the rest due by 
March 1973.  The Commonwealth Office, however, argued strongly that such a move 
would provoke retaliation against British businesses, goods, and nationals.  The 
advice concluded that ‘they [Malaysian government] are capable of acting 
emotionally and irrationally and would be quite likely to do so in these 
circumstances’.47  The link to aid was quickly, if reluctantly, dropped because of the 
dangers of pushing Tan too far.  Aid was not a bargaining chip.  The contention that 
Malaysia maintained its assets in sterling in order to promote a good aid settlement is 
further undermined by the fact that Singapore had diversified unilaterally and with 
impunity in 1967. 
     By this time, the Bank’s view was that ‘We all feel very strongly that the 
Malaysians are outdoing the Australians in their intransigence’.48  On 10 September, 
London offered an agreement equivalent to the one concluded with Australia with a 
40% MSP and a private agreement to keep a higher proportion.49  In Malaysia’s case 
the private target was the status quo, 50% plus allowance for the currency board (i.e. 
56%).  The Malaysians agreed to the public MSP but wanted a lower private level and 
repeated that they would not agree to have such a side agreement written down, but 
only an oral commitment. The dispute dragged on until a meeting between Tan and 
the Chancellor on 23 September where Tan gave his verbal undertaking to consult 
London if Malaysia found it difficult to maintain sterling at 50% of reserves.   
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     The final terms of the sterling agreement left Malaysia in practice very nearly 
where they had started in February 1968, when they agreed a programme of 
diversification down to 50% of total reserves, so it cannot be considered a victory for 
the Malaysian side.  In addition, however, they now had an exchange guarantee for 
the US$ value of 90% of official reserves, although the Malaysians persistently 
worried about a potential depreciation of the US$ (rather than of the £), which would 
erode this advantage.  The victory for Malaysia was to get a deal at least as favourable 
as that offered to Singapore and Australia.   
     The operation of the agreement went ahead smoothly despite domestic political 
turmoil in 1969, although the BNM resisted reporting its sterling assets regularly.  
Figure 3 shows that during 1969 total reserves increased sharply as the price of rubber 
recovered and the value of total exports surged. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
Figure 4 shows the differing patterns in the sterling holdings of Singapore and 
Malaysia under the agreements. 
 
[insert Figure 4 here] 
 
In terms of total reserves held in sterling, Malaysia retained the amount at a fairly 
constant level of between £150-160m, but the share in total reserves declined during 
the export booms of 1969 and again in 1972.  The informal agreement of 50% was in 
fact binding for Malaysia after they diversified its reserves steadily during 1969.  In 
the first quarter of 1970 Malaysia had to sell US$ and DM to a value of £16.2m to 
keep sterling holdings above 50% of reserves.50  Once the informal target was 
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dropped in September 1971 and the MSP reduced to 36% Malaysia diversified 
quickly, although not as far as the new MSP.  Conversely, the share of sterling in 
Singapore’s reserve increased during the second half of 1969 to above 50% in June 
1970.  They then returned to about 46% from July 1970 to July 1971.  After the Nixon 
shock of August 1971 and the subsequent depreciation of the US$ they reduced the 
sterling share closer to the new MSP of 36%.  Figure 5 shows that the amount of 
sterling under guarantee increased for Singapore, but was quite stable for Malaysia.  
As we shall see, Malaysia allowed its agreement to lapse in June 1972 after sterling 
floated and thus were never able to take advantage of the exchange guarantee. 
 
[insert Figure 5 here] 
 
Leaving Sterling  
Malaysia quickly became frustrated by the sterling agreement as the international 
monetary system crumbled.  From early in its operation (and consistent with the 
criticism of the operation of the international monetary system generally) Malaysian 
officials in both the Treasury and the central bank began to worry about the 
implications of a depreciation of the US$, but their fears were repeatedly dismissed in 
London.  During his meeting with the Chancellor in September 1968, Tan first raised 
the possibility of a US$ devaluation but the Bank of England arrogantly dismissed 
this as an ‘economic conceit to imagine that Malaysia could appreciate against the US 
dollar’.51  From early 1971 as the prospect for renewal of the sterling agreements 
approached, Ismail, Choi and Tan repeatedly complained about the weakness of the 
US$ and tried to press for an exchange guarantee in terms of gold.   They also 
signalled early on that any renewal of the agreement would require the end of the oral 
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commitment to a higher proportion than the formal MSP.52  The proposed guarantee 
in terms of gold was abruptly dismissed when Jeremy Morse visited KL in March 
1971 to canvas the possibility of a straight renewal of the agreements when they 
expired in September.53  Tan asked for an interview with the Chancellor on the 
sterling agreements when he was in London, and they had a 40 minute discussion on 
the topic on 14 May.  He again pressed for a gold guarantee given the turmoil in 
international currency markets in the spring of 1971 which had resulted in the 
revaluation of the DM.54    The Chancellor ‘made it clear that the UK could not move 
on this issue’ because it would unpick the whole basis of the 34 sterling agreements 
and would add to uncertainty in international markets. 55  While most other sterling 
area countries were happy to acquiesce to the straight renewal, Malaysia tried to adapt 
the terms to their forecasted adjustments in the US$/gold rate.   
     At the end of July 1971 with two months left in the 1968 agreements, the 
Chancellor sent out invitations to all sterling countries to renew their agreements for a 
further two years with a unilateral and across the board reduction of 10% in all MSPs.  
London believed the agreements helped confidence in sterling, but they did not want 
to repeat the bitter bilateral negotiations of 1968.  For Malaysia, the Chancellor 
proposed reducing the private working target to 45% from 50%.  Tan replied on the 
day before the Nixon shock that he was ready to accept the 36% MSP but he refused 
to renew the working target. 56  Eventually the Chancellor of the Exchequer had to 
give way on this point.  It was the easiest concession to make since it could be kept 
private, and thus not provide a precedent for other states to argue for concessions.57  
      On 23 August in the midst of the turmoil of the Nixon shock and while exchange 
markets were closed, Tan was taken into hospital suffering from pneumonia, which 
delayed the final agreement.  This, in turn, prolonged the conclusion of agreements 
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with Singapore and Australia who were waiting to confirm that there would be no 
further concessions to Malaysia.   The draft letters were finally sent to Tan in hospital 
at the start of September and agreed just in time on 7 September 1971.58  The formal 
text retained the reference to Malaysia’s aim to hold ‘appreciably more’ of its reserves 
in sterling, but this was no longer privately specified.  To outside observers, therefore, 
it was a straight renewal.  Nevertheless, London had to release Australia from their 
private working target for fear that the Australians would learn of the concession to 
Malaysia.  As noted in the Treasury ‘we could not afford the loss of Australian 
goodwill which would result if they learnt (and we must expect they will) of a 
concession made to Malaysia but not generalized to them’.59
     It is particularly curious given the sensitivity of Tan and Ismail to the value of the 
US$ that they concluded their second sterling agreement in September 1971 right 
after the Nixon Shock, but that the intervention rate for the guarantee was not a 
subject of discussion. In the event, because the $2.38 rate was explicitly referred to in 
the agreements rather than a par rate, the depreciation of the US$ against sterling from 
$2.40/£ to $2.60/£ under the Smithsonian agreements made the guarantee effectively 
inoperable.  The sterling/US$ exchange rate could fall 8.5% before compensation 
would need to be paid.  Tan wrote to the Chancellor to request a change in the trigger 
rate on 12 February 1972 in terms that suggest he expected the request to be 
uncontroversial.60  Singapore went a step further and requested a formal review of the 
entire sterling agreement, with a view to abandoning it.  For the British this posed 
considerable risk since if Singapore dropped the agreement, they would have to be 
ejected from the sterling area and exchange controls would need to be introduced 
between Singapore and Malaysia, which would be very difficult given the 
transferability of currencies.  If, on the other hand, Malaysia followed Singapore in 
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abrogating the agreement (which seemed likely) this would substantially reduce the 
proportion of total sterling covered by the agreements and thus mark ‘the effective 
collapse of the structure of the Agreements’.61
      The Malaysians assumed that the trigger rate for the guarantee would be 
automatically adjusted, but they were firmly rebuffed in a letter from the Chancellor 
delivered at the beginning of April 1972.  Raymond Bell, Third Secretary of the UK 
Treasury visited KL on 12 April to discuss the issue with Malek Merican, Deputy 
Secretary of the Malaysian Treasury and Choi, Deputy Governor of the central bank, 
but there was no meeting of minds.  The Malaysians could not understand how the 
UK could not agree to restore the spirit of the agreement.  The British argued that 
Malaysia had benefited from the stability of sterling that the agreements promoted, 
and high yields in London.  Their sterling assets continued to be guaranteed at the 
price they had been acquired.  The Malaysian side acknowledged the longer term gain 
from the system, but argued that Tan’s political position was exceptionally fragile if a 
further sterling devaluation was looming.62  Bell argued that the prospects for sterling 
were good, but with memories of 1967 assurances in mind, the Malaysian side 
remained unconvinced. 
     The next day the British delegation met with Tan and Ismail.  Tan brought along a 
dossier of clippings as evidence that there was a genuine risk that sterling would be 
devalued in the coming months.63  Indeed, the Finance Ministry and the central bank 
(correctly) expected sterling to be devalued by the end of the year on the basis of 
these various accounts and Chancellor of the Exchequer Barber’s most recent budget 
speech.  Bell responded that Barbers’ public comments about a more flexible 
exchange rate referred to his longer term proposals for the reform of the international 
monetary system, and reasserted that the UK government had no intention to devalue 
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during the period of the sterling agreements.  Tan argued that he could not afford 
politically to be caught out by another sterling devaluation, noting that ‘even a donkey 
does not knock his head on the same rock twice’.64  He had been assured there would 
be no devaluation in 1967 and also that the US would not raise the price of gold but 
both assurances had proved empty.  Tan admitted that sterling reserves could not be 
diversified quickly given the weakness of the US$ and the unwillingness of other 
countries like Germany and Japan to have their currencies held as reserve assets.  In 
March 1972 45% of Malaysia’s reserves were still in sterling, amounting to £147m, 
which was well above the 36% MSP.  Nevertheless, Tan advised Bell that unless an 
amendment was made to the trigger rate, Malaysia would allow the agreement to 
lapse by letting its sterling reserves to fall below the MSP.  Bell confirmed that 
Malaysia would not then be eligible for the guarantee if sterling were subsequently 
devalued. 
     After these meetings, Tan wrote to Barber on 21 April 1972 to complain that ‘I 
must admit that until I received your reply, I felt that the amendment proposed by us 
should present no difficulty to you...our recent talks with your Mr Bell confirmed our 
worst fears’.65  He concluded that if the amendment was not forthcoming, Malaysia 
needed more latitude with its reserves policy and he reserved his position, warning 
that we ‘may find it necessary to inform you that we have to re-consider our position 
in regard to the Agreement’. Barber responded rather equivocally on 12 May as 
speculative pressure was building against sterling.  He asserted that ‘Britain’s external 
position is now stronger than for many years. There will naturally be fluctuations. 
Some things may go less well in the period ahead. Other things may go better’.66   
      The problems of the sterling agreement drew Malaysia and Singapore together in 
a united front against the UK.  Just before Bell’s visit, Lee Kwan Yew and Goh Keng 
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Swee arrived in KL from Singapore to finalise the distribution of the currency board 
assets, resolve a long-running and bitter dispute over Malaysia-Singapore Airlines, 
and announce cooperation on international monetary affairs.67  The two states also 
tried to bring the Australians with them in a joint request to change the intervention 
rate for the guarantee, but the latter had no sympathy for the cause.68  Phillips, 
Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, professed to Bank of England officials 
that he was surprised by the approach from Singapore and Malaysia, and agreed to 
meet with them formally to discuss the issue (along with New Zealand), but reassured 
his London counterparts that ‘so far as Singapore and Malaysia were concerned, he 
would continue to counsel moderation and patience on the lines he had done 
already.’69  Bell’s impression of opinion in Singapore, which convinced his masters in 
London, was that Goh was much more hostile to the sterling agreement per se than 
Tan, who wanted to continue the agreement but with the trigger rate adjusted.70  The 
actual positions of Tan and Goh turned out to be the opposite once sterling floated. 
     A month after Barber’s equivocal letter to Tan, sterling collapsed and had to be 
floated free of its fixed exchange rate on 23rd June. Malaysia’s reaction was the most 
negative and vociferous of all the sterling countries as Tan accused the government of 
‘deliberate duplicity in having refused Malaysia’s request for a new guarantee’.71  The 
chairman of the Singapore Monetary Authority, Wong, told the UK High 
Commissioner that they no longer felt bound by the sterling agreement, although they 
did continue with it until it expired, unlike Malaysia.  Singapore announced that it had 
lost S$45m as a result of the float but Tan refused to reveal Malaysia’s losses.  On the 
basis of the amount of sterling in reserves in May 1972 the losses were probably of 
the order of US$21m or M$59m. 
       In Parliament, Tan boasted that  
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‘the House can rest assured that we have done everything possible to 
safeguard the value of our external assets. We have not waited for events to 
happen before acting…indeed we do not think we are claiming too much when 
we say that we have anticipated events in this field more accurately and earlier 
than most other countries.’72   
 
In order to maintain a pegged exchange rate both Malaysia and Singapore shifted their 
anchor from sterling to the US$, thus marking the end of the historic link to sterling.  
In fact, they were quite late in taking this step as Australia and New Zealand had 
shifted their peg to the US$ as part of the Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971.  
     During the first 5 months of 1972 (after the Smithsonian agreement and while the 
discussions over the trigger rate were underway) Malaysia reduced its sterling 
holdings by £26m, lowering the sterling proportion from 49% to 41%.  After the float 
of sterling on 23 June, diversification to European currencies accelerated, and by 10 
July 1972 the proportion of sterling was below the 36% MSP threshold.   The Bank of 
England reported that £40m was transferred by Malaysia to deposit at European 
commercial banks, half in Germany and a further £15m in Switzerland.73 The 
evidence is a bit ambiguous but hints from the BNM at the time suggest that, despite 
his claims in parliament, Tan did not move substantially out of sterling before the 
float.74
     Despite the renewed sense of betrayal over the sterling float (or sink) so soon after 
re-assurances from London, the subsequent depreciation of sterling appears to have 
caused Tan to regret abandoning the right to compensation under the Sterling 
Agreement.  He wrote to Barber in early July 1972 offering to restore Malaysia’s 
sterling proportion to 36% if Barber agreed to amend the intervention rate to $2.60 
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with retrospective effect from December 1971, the date of the Smithsonian 
agreement.75  This would mean effective compensation for the depreciation of sterling 
from $2.60 to $2.45 where it had stabilised by early July.  Ex post compensation was 
not on the table, but officials from the Treasury and the Bank of England were sent 
out to KL to seek a new sterling agreement. UK Treasury officials and the BNM 
favoured a new agreement with a trigger rate of perhaps $2.50, but Tan refused even 
to consider a new agreement without compensation for losses from the float and the 
talks were abandoned.76 By this time Ismail was clear that the sterling agreement had 
been broken and he expressed his understanding to Bank of England officials that this 
made Malaysia ineligible for the guarantee in the future.  When sterling was floated, 
the UK disbanded the sterling area and imposed exchange controls equally between 
sterling and non-sterling countries.  Ismail told the Bank of England that one of the 
reasons for breaking the agreement was fear that Malaysia’s sterling balances would 
ultimately be blocked by London.77  This is evidence of a final collapse in the trust 
between KL and London and it is striking that Malaysia was the only sterling country 
to abrogate its sterling agreement in response to the float.  Three months later, on 24 
October 1972 sterling fell below the original trigger point of $2.38 and the exchange 
guarantee was activated.  Malaysia was no longer eligible for compensation but 
Singapore still held 41% of its reserves in sterling at this point and had £224.4m in 
guaranteed sterling assets, so they were paid £4.7m compensation.   
     Table 2 shows the declining share of Malaysia in official holdings of sterling 
reserves.  By the time they abrogated the agreement, which was received with relative 
equanimity in London, they held less than 4% of overseas sterling reserves compared 
with over 17% in 1966.  This was mainly due to accumulations elsewhere, in 
particular oil producing countries like Kuwait and Nigeria at the end of the 1960s.  
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London’s attention had by this time moved beyond Malaysia and the abrogation of the 
sterling agreement did not disrupt relations with London. 
 
[insert Table 2 here] 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system posed new challenges for the leaders of 
many newly independent states like Malaysia.  The case of Malaysia is distinctive due 
to the large amount of sterling involved and because of the bitter relations between 
Malaysia on one hand and Britain and Singapore on the other.  A decade after 
independence, the Malaysian government and central bank were faced with a series of 
challenges that forced them to develop an independent policy, leading to the end of 
the historic role of sterling in their international monetary regime.  Like some 
economies today that are faced with accumulated reserves largely comprised of a 
depreciating currency (now the US$), Malaysia had to disentangle itself from sterling 
at a time when there were no clear alternatives since gold was scarce, the US$ was 
weak and Germany, Switzerland and Japan resisted the use of their currencies as 
national reserves. External obstacles as well as some misjudgement meant that this 
was only achieved in June 1972, but this was still two and a half years before most 
other sterling area countries finally abandoned their Sterling Agreements.   
     The archive evidence shows that Tan and Ismail correctly predicted shocks to the 
system (change in the gold price and depreciation of sterling) and sought to adapt 
their Sterling Agreement to protect themselves but they failed, partly because of 
intransigence in London and the lack of concerted cooperation from other sterling 
holders.  On the one hand Tan appears to have repeatedly trusted reassurances from 
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London and relied on his personal relationship with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
but on the other hand he railed against the dominance of British influence and sought 
to identify a policy that better reflected Malaysia’s national interest.   
     The large value of sterling assets held by Malaysia as a legacy of the colonial 
monetary system turned out to be a mixed blessing.  On the one hand it made London 
take Malaysia’s claims seriously and they expended a great deal of time in the 
negotiations.  On the other hand, London could not afford to make significant 
concessions to Malaysia, partly because of the intrinsic cost given the size of the 
assets, and partly because of the precedent this would set for other countries.  We 
have also seen that the large value of sterling assets constrained Malaysia’s ability to 
diversify since they could not sell off a significant proportion of their sterling assets 
without undermining international confidence in the exchange rate of the pound, 
thereby precipitating the devaluation of their remaining sterling assets.  A further 
consideration was the low market price of longer term British government securities, 
which meant that rapid sales would incur capital losses. Beyond these external 
limitations on policy-making, the process of disengaging from sterling was prolonged 
by traditional relationships with London that persisted despite repeated betrayals of 
Malaysia’s interests.  This has revealed the struggle to identify and implement an 
independent economic policy even after the political climacteric of 1969. 
     Malaysia was slower to react to the new realities of its loosened relations with 
London than Singapore was, and ministers were acutely aware that they did not 
benefit from the comparison with the more forward looking and independent policy of 
Singapore in 1967.  Drawing on this experience, and the betrayal by advisers in 
London, Tan tried to drive a hard bargain over the freedom to determine the currency 
composition of the reserves in 1968.  In this, he successfully achieved a deal 
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equivalent to that of Australia and Singapore, which was much more than London 
initially offered, but it was not much better than the status quo ante.  Malaysia faced a 
further disappointment in August 1971 when the guarantee trigger was not revised to 
take account of the US$ devaluation.  Nevertheless, they continued to adhere to their 
sterling agreement and to peg to sterling despite the fact that the UK accounted for 
only 10% percent of their total trade and that other countries like Australia and New 
Zealand chose this moment to shift their exchange rate anchor to the US$.  It took the 
float of the pound in June 1972 in the context of local inflationary pressure to push 
Tan to abandon sterling, but by this time it was arguably too late.   
     Malaysia’s postcolonial monetary relations were clearly complex and determined 
by both political and economic events beyond local control as well as by the legacy of 
colonial relationships.  In the run-up to devaluation in 1967, Malaysia’s relations with 
the UK conformed more closely to the neo-colonial interpretation than in the years 
that followed.  Malaysian policy through most of the 1960s has been shown to have 
been fairly passive, reflecting loyalty to sterling and trust in British advisers. The 
devaluation in 1967 emerges as a watershed in attitudes driven by the sense of 
betrayal in Kuala Lumpur, the lack of support from London over how to deal with the 
impact of the devaluation, and the revelation of Singapore’s more independent policy.  
However, while Tan and Ismail more clearly identified Malaysia’s national interests 
as separate from the UK, they did not succeed in implementing an independent policy 
until 1972.  
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Table 1: Proportion of sterling in official reserves                              
 Australia New Zealand Malaysia  Singapore 
1964 79 98 96 100 
1965 70 97 96 98 
1966 69 97 90 93 
Jun-67 64 80 87 74 
Oct-67 60 85 82 50 
Dec-68 46 76 58 44 
 
Source: BE OV44/116.  1968 from TNA T312/2811, T312/2804, T312/2649, 
T312/2312.   
 
 
Table 2. Malaysia’s Share of Sterling Area Sterling Reserves 
 Percent of Sterling Area Sterling 
Reserves 
June 1966 17.2 
October 1968 7.8 
May 1972 3.8 
Source: June 1966, Treasury Historical Memorandum, The Sterling Balances since 
the War. TNA T267/29. For 1968 and 1972, BE EID15/5 and EID15/7. 
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